"THE AMERICAN HAS DWINDLED INTO AN ODD FELLOW"

2016 Annus horribilis - there can be no question that the 24th of June and the 8th of November have given voice to an extraordinary number of discontented, dissatisfied and hostile people on both sides of the Atlantic. The deep seated racism and bigotry that has oozed out from the so called common citizen is horrifying. A distinct side step from a natural evolution towards a more civilised society. As long as humans grew in prosperity and education, and improved the quality of their lives through common endeavour and enterprise, towards a more inclusive and caring society, respecting the principles of the duty of care - the foundation of our rule of law - to each and every citizen, things appeared to be moving along quite nicely. But conservative laissez faire economics of the 1980's laid the foundations for greed accompanied by bullying and acute selfishness. We were riding high of what appeared to be a float of cash which seemed unending but in the end turned out to be quicksand. Those people, who for years have been struggling out of the quicksand, have turned to someone who appears to have risen above the mire and promises to end their struggles and bring them up to the promised land he holds. They believe he can do that. His lies of being the 'self made' billionaire who owes no allegiance to anyone, who can protect them from the world, from the encroaching hordes from below and over the sea, has been music to their ears. They believe he can change their lot and bring them back to solid ground. They do not see it as bluster and smoke. He says he can make deals that will bring them the wealth, recognition and prosperity that he has. It is nothing but a shell game, but a shell game without the pea. Who will help them when it eventually dawns that it is in fact a sham?

For my class in Paris I have been reading, again, Henry David Thoreau's Civil Disobedience. I should have been paying more attention all along. In it, there are two paragraphs which seem relevant in the current circumstance:

All voting is a sort of gaming, like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is but little slavery left to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote.

and 

I hear of a convention to be held at Baltimore, or elsewhere, for the selection of a candidate for the Presidency, made up chiefly of editors, and men who are politicians by profession; but I think, what is it to any independent, intelligent, and respectable man what decision they may come to? Shall we not have the advantage of this wisdom and honesty, nevertheless? Can we not count upon some independent votes? Are there not many individuals in the country who do not attend conventions? But no: I find that the respectable man, so called, has immediately drifted from his position, and despairs of his country, when his country has more reasons to despair of him. He forthwith adopts one of the candidates thus selected as the only available one, thus proving that he is himself available for any purposes of the demagogue. His vote is of no more worth than that of any unprincipled foreigner or hireling native, who may have been bought. O for a man who is a man, and, and my neighbor says, has a bone is his back which you cannot pass your hand through! Our statistics are at fault: the population has been returned too large. How many men are there to a square thousand miles in the country? Hardly one. Does not America offer any inducement for men to settle here? The American has dwindled into an Odd Fellow--one who may be known by the development of his organ of gregariousness, and a manifest lack of intellect and cheerful self-reliance; whose first and chief concern, on coming into the world, is to see that the almshouses are in good repair; and, before yet he has lawfully donned the virile garb, to collect a fund to the support of the widows and orphans that may be; who, in short, ventures to live only by the aid of the Mutual Insurance company, which has promised to bury him decently. 

There is something in that last sentence which strikes me as appropriate to the current citizenry of the United States. They appear to have regressed to the 19th century. It may well take another two centuries to recover from this current blow to civilisation. 

RISING ABOVE ? I CANNOT GIVE AN OPINION

Returning to the matter of sympathy I am somewhat in a quandary. I am, after some thought, finding it difficult to form an opinion. There are several questions that arise. One is whether there is a distinction between sympathy and empathy? Another is whether, when in sympathy with another person’s situation, the opinions one forms as a result of being in sympathy, are sufficiently informed? Or whether one’s opinions on any matter are sufficiently informed.

So far as empathy is concerned, I am informed that it is the psychological identification with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another, or, the imaginative ascribing to an object, as a natural object or work of art, feelings or attitudes present in oneself.

As to sympathy it is being in harmony with, or agreement in, feeling, as between persons, or on the part of one person with respect to another. Or further, the harmony of feeling naturally existing between persons of like tastes or opinion or of congenial dispositions, or, still further, the fact or power of sharing the feelings of another, especially in sorrow or trouble; fellow feeling, compassion, or commiseration; a relationship between persons in which the condition of one induces a parallel or reciprocal condition in another.

What Adam Smith does is effectively bring the whole lot together under the name of sympathy. In his lecture M. Rateau emphasized the question of levels or strength of feeling felt by the sympathizer towards the person concerned.  The sympathizer cannot possibly reach the same intensity of feeling as the person concerned. The feelings felt by the sympathizer being one step removed as it were. Smith then argues that the intensity of feeling in the sympathizer increases where the person concerned appears to be in more control of their feelings, caused by whatever situation initiated their great distress or joy in the first place. Indeed, there could come a point at which the person concerned is so cool as to cause the sympathizer to become more agitated by the lack of distress or joy shown by the person concerned.  In general, however, the sympathizer seems to be more drawn in as the person concerned seems able to cope with their feelings. It is seen as being brave, which is viewed as a virtuous quality and consequently more attractive.

To illustrate this point, M. Rateau brought up the matter of Socrates; his acceptance of the verdict against him, his acceptance of the sentence, his refusal to leave town and his acquiescence in drinking the hemlock, all as a result of his determination to obey the law and maintain his principles. We sympathize with his plight and admire his actions as beyond the ordinary. He is seen as a man of integrity, brave, virtuous and principled. The representational painting by Jacques-Louis David amply demonstrates the situation, with Socrates exclaiming to the last and his followers showing various and great levels of distress, in sympathy.

The death of Socrates (1787) by J-L David

Rising above a situation does seem to be viewed as an attractive quality. A person seen fighting back the tears often brings people closer, encouraging them to ‘let it all out’ with supportive pats on the back and hugs.

However, is rising above always the thing to do. Might is not be considered an act of stupidity, or indeed carry with it some level of deception, particularly if the rising above is of no real consequence? There can be situations where rising above is the easier course of action. Surely it is a matter of degree and situation.

In the matter of Socrates, he was accused of moral corruption and impiety. The moral corruption concerned the ‘moral corruption of Athenian youth’. As to the impiety, it consisted of “failing to acknowledge the gods that the city acknowledges” and “introducing new deities”.

In the event, friends, followers, and students encouraged Socrates to flee Athens, which action the citizens expected; yet, on principle, Socrates refused to flout the law and escape his legal responsibility to Athens. Apparently, faithful to his teaching of civic obedience to the law, the 70-year-old Socrates executed his death-sentence, and drank the hemlock, as condemned at trial. Yet, it was brought out at trial that at least two of his young followers participated in acts against the democratic government in favour of dictatorships. Not exactly faithful to civic obedience of the law.

Indeed, in 2012, in The New Trial of Socrates an international panel of ten judges held a mock re-trial of Socrates to resolve the matter of the charges levelled against him by Meletus, Anytos, and Lycon, that: “Socrates is a doer of evil, and corrupter of the youth, and he does not believe in the gods of the state, and he believes in other new divinities of his own”; by split decision, five judges voted “Guilty” and five judges voted “Not guilty”, which acquitted Socrates of corruption of the young and of impiety against the Athenian pantheon. Limiting themselves to the facts of the case against Socrates, the judges did not consider any sentence; the judges who voted the philosopher guilty said that they would not have considered the death penalty for Socrates. The original Athenian jury consisted of some 500 worthies of the city. The guilty verdict was by majority, and it appears the imposition of the death penalty was by way of an even greater majority.  Bearing in mind these events took place in 399 BC, 2415 years ago, clearly views were a bit harsher.

Much of this was unknown to me. Also Socrates was 70, quite an advanced age in 399 BC, although according to some research, that was about average for the ancient Greeks and in some cases they lived even longer. Nonetheless, living longer may not have been right for him. Given all the surrounding circumstances, was he so brave or just accepting the inevitable, or is the mere act of acceptance an act of bravery to be applauded and viewed as virtuous.

So my dilemma and concern about forming an opinion without sufficient information, or to paraphrase Herr Doctor Winkel “I cannot give an opinion, the effects would have been the same.”

There may be a small prize for people who can tell me who Dr Winkel is. 

SYMPATHY FOR TODAY

Today is Adam Smith day at Paris I, with Monsieur Paul Rateau

Paul RATEAU

Maître de conférences [Philosophie]

Curriculum Vitae :

I. TITRES ET DIPLÔMES - Maître de conférences à l’Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) (depuis 2008). - Thèse de doctorat : « La question du mal chez Leibniz : fondements et élaboration de la   Théodicée »,    soutenue à l’Université de Strasbourg (2005).    Directrice de thèse: Mme Martine de Gaudemar (Paris X-Nanterre).  -Agrégé de philosophie (1998).  -Ancien élève de l’École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud (1994). II. FONCTIONS ANTÉRIEURES    2008-2007 : Assistant post-doctorant à l’Université de Neuchâtel (Suisse).    2006-2004 : ATER (attaché temporaire d’enseignement et de recherche) à l’Université de Strasbourg.    2003-2000 : AMN (allocataire moniteur normalien) à l’Université de Strasbourg. So far M. Rateau has been the clearest of the lecturer's I have encountered. He is part of the CHSPM - Centre d'histoire des systèmes de pensée moderne.

I have been musing on the stuff we have been reading so far. I do hope it makes sense. At least you can be sympathetic.

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is written in seven parts. He begins the first part with “Of the Propriety of Actions”, Section I ‘Of the sense of propriety”. Chapter I, Of Sympathy. He then goes on at some length to discuss how he believes relationships between individuals work. How do ordinary individuals relate to each other in society and what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Does that behaviour arise naturally, from within, or artificially, of necessity through education and convention?

He appears to be suggesting that in order for individuals to survive there must be a certain degree of ‘sympathy’ between them, that there is some sort of harmony or agreement between them, or on the part of one person with respect to another.  The premise is that there is an universal sympathy between persons arising through the senses of the body, in that every human understands pain and pleasure from their own experience, e.g. by being hit, or injuring oneself through accident, suffering from cold or heat, the loss of a loved one, anxieties of love, jealousy and hate, resentments, in short any number of ‘feelings’ which are viewed as part of the ‘human condition’.

How a person displays those feelings, and how others react to those feelings is dependent on the degree of closeness between them, e.g. wife, child, cousin, friend, casual acquaintance, stranger… The extent and character of the behaviour displayed by the individual exhibiting those feelings, will of course vary in degree and proportion according to circumstances.  Similarly the response, and the extent and character of the behaviour, of the person for whom the display is intended, will vary in some degree depending on circumstances. It is the same for the casual observer of the display. Whether that display is appropriate or inappropriate in the particular circumstances depends on the ‘conventions’ society has accepted as being appropriate or inappropriate in the circumstances. The behaviour can be viewed as an over reaction or woefully lacking in feeling.  Again it is a matter of degree and circumstance. In addition, because of the nature of human sympathy in respect of certain matters, e.g. the death of a loved one, the birth of a child, there is an expectation, by others, that the person concerned will react in a certain way. Whether that is the result of education and convention or indeed natural sympathy, might well depend on the individual concerned. It is a matter of propriety and not just a question of mimicry.

The matter of sympathy, then, is a vital condition in understanding communication between individuals in society, and fundamental to the languages we use. The nature of sympathy will remain unchanged no matter what the situation, where-so-ever we are. The matter of propriety, however, is entirely dependent on the situation and the circumstances in which we find ourselves.

After todays lecture there is more to come on this subject - Adam Smith is a problem or perhaps it is M. Rateau.

MULLING AT THE PANTHEON-SORBONNE AND THE TUILLERIE

The teaching methods at 'Paris I' are a bit different from Dartington and Falmouth. Admittedly, my recent pedagogic experience has been with a mere five tutors, one of whom has been particularly influential in my recent academic life. Also, the number of students per lecture was considerably smaller at the English Institutions. This allowed for much more discussion and argument during the course of a lecture. In addition, there were occasional one to one sessions with a tutor, some of which were scheduled but tutors were more or less available at any time on request. In the course of study one felt there was always a close guiding hand of a person willing to listen and give progressive feedback, despite the overall demands on their time, to the work one was doing. At least that was my experience. Here, in Paris, although only an 'auditeur libre', one is pretty much on one's own. I believe there is some access to the teaching staff, but they seem to come in and out of the lectures pretty swiftly. Not many of the students seems to engage directly with the teachers outside the lecture room, save for discussing schedules and such. I may be wrong about that, but it is the impression I have. During the course of a lecture there can be a number of 'exposé' by students. This is a presentation by a student doing a close reading of a particular text. The class is then invited to ask questions of the presenter after which the lecturer then elaborates on the subject, presumably tying it all together. I am no longer used to the speed at which the French speak and, in a crowded room, what with rustlings, other surrounding noises and the irritating habit the French have of shortening words by oral abbreviations, it is difficult to catch everything.

This is just an early impression of things at the moment, the content of the lectures is new to me and I am beginning to appreciate the material. I have not read Hume or Smith in any detail before, and it is exciting stuff. At least I think so. As to Thoreau, well, in the sixties he seemed extremely relevant. Not to say that some of his stuff has lost its edge, but, in my present circumstance, it is not as attractive as the Scottish Enlightenment.  It is still very much a worthwhile subject of study and one cannot help but admire Thoreau's tenacity in trying to make a reality of the words proffered by the first two sentences of the Declaration of Independence and the preamble to the Constitution of the United States. He was very much a man of his time. But that is another story. At least he was around for the camera. 

David Hume 1711-1776

Adam Smith 1723-1790

Henry Thoreau 1817-1862

It is interesting to note that Hume died the year of the Declaration of Independence, Smith died in the infancy of the French Revolution just one year old, and Thoreau died at the beginnings of the American Civil War.

The present study of Hume is from  Volume Two of the Treatise on Human Nature, Book Three - Of Morals, Part II  Of Justice and Injustice, Of the Origin of Justice and Property, Of the Rules which determine property, Of the Obligations of promises; Part III Of other virtues and vices, Of the Origins of the Natural Virtues and Vices.

As to Smith, we are dealing with The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part I Of the Property of Actions, Section I Of the Sense of Propriety, Chapter I Of Sympathy, Chapter III Of the Manner in Which we Judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other Men, by their concord and dissonance with our own.

We have just been for a walk in the Tuilleries Gardens where there is at present an exhibition of various pieces of sculpture.

     

       

A bit nippy, the weather, but lovely and warm in the sun. There is also on display a series of photographs accompanied by displayed text by way of explanation. A bit of performance writing. The pictures are not in the correct order, The texts are in English and French are are meant to be read from one panel to the next as they are incomplete on each panel. The panels are some distance apart and it is not easy, unless one walks quite some distance between them all, to follow the text in some grammatical order. One assumes, as the text concerns instructions for photographing plants and other feature in gardens, that it is meant to be read in some sort of cohesive sequence. Of course I am probably wrong about that, as I am about so many things.

As to sympathy, according to Smith, I cannot say that I was in any kind of sympathetic state in respect of these panels and the absent artist. The photographs, in Celia's opinion, were not very good. I was, according to Smith, in sympathy with her. It is, of course, more difficult to feel or express sympathy in the absence of a subject, nor do I suppose it is possible to be sympathetic to an inanimate object. Does sympathy require, as object, a living creature, and in particular, a creature with which we have some familiarity, or can one feel sympathy towards an object, particularly in respect of a work of art, or piece of craftsmanship, or what some would class as an 'objet trouvé', or indeed any object that takes our fancy.

If we have sympathy as signifier what is the signified? As a representamen, what can the object and interpretant be? With this stuff it is all dependent naturally on context, as with everything.

I am coming to grips with Hume's views on justice and property, whether natural of artifice. Sympathy plays a great role in the emergence of justice and it is no wonder that Hume and Smith were such great friends and in great sympathy with each other. I am still mulling but there will be more of this anon.